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Unstoppable v. Unwaivable
Steven Benjamin*
I’ve had some question as to what I wanted to do with you
today. My assigned topic is to talk to you about my experience
with indigent defense reform in Virginia. I’ve been asked to tell
you that story to illustrate many of the points that you’ve heard
discussed over these remarkable two days. But I think too that I
want to do something in addition for some of you, especially the
law students who are in attendance. How many law students are
here? Oh, that’s wonderful. Now I know what I want to do. I want
to talk to you about what it is to be a criminal defense lawyer
because you heard Norman [Reimer], our brilliant executive
director, identify himself as a criminal defense lawyer, and say
that he always has been, he always will be, and there is nothing
he is prouder of than that fact.
So let me tell you about my first death penalty case. I was
not so many years out of law school, when I woke up one morning
to find in my paper the headline that several young men had been
arrested the night before for the brutal assassination of a hotel
clerk and a businessman in a botched hotel robbery. They had
committed, obviously, capital crimes, they would be charged with
capital murder, the death sentence would be sought, and I was
sick to my stomach because I knew one of these young men. He
was a kid I had represented from the projects on a variety of
misdemeanor charges and now he was facing a certain death
sentence, and I knew that the call would come. I was happy to see
that he was appointed counsel, but I was unhappy with what
might be expected from that counsel.
I hoped that he wouldn’t call, but he called and I went to see
him, and he begged me to represent him. I agreed to do so as long
as he agreed that the only goal of my representation would be to
* President, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. This
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save his life, and that the certain outcome would be his receiving
at least a mandatory life sentence without parole. His guilt was
obvious, he had been caught there at the scene, there was no
question about it, the only question was whether he would die,
and certainly he would, but I would try to avoid that, and he
agreed to those terms.
We went to trial, and because this was such an awful case
and the publicity so extreme—this happened in Henrico County,
Virginia—a jury was brought in from Albemarle County, and
they were sequestered for the duration of the trial. The first part
went as expected, and he was convicted of capital murder; and
then came the second part, and that was the death phase, that’s
what they call it. That is an awful experience, I’ll just tell you. It’s
unconscionable that our system permits one person, requires one
person to take responsibility for another person’s life. When I
arrived at the courthouse that morning, it hit me, terribly, that
this young man was going to die because it was then and it
remains still a fact in Virginia that if you are sentenced to death
you will be put to death, and you will die within four to five years.
That is a given in Virginia. It was also a given that day, many
years ago, that at the end of that day my client was going to
receive the death sentence. And the only way he was not going to
receive the death sentence was if I performed at a level of such
extraordinary skill, a level that so exceeded my ability, that the
only chance he had was if I was 100 times, 1000 times a better
lawyer than I knew I was, and yet I was his only hope. With those
thoughts and knowing that the day was going to end with the
imposition of a sentence of death, a result that was my
responsibility to avoid, I went into that courtroom. That is what
criminal defense lawyers live with every single day, that degree
of responsibility.
The morning proceeded pretty badly. This guy had terrorized
the public housing communities during these years of drug wars,
and the police would come in as witnesses and take the stand and
talk about their surveillance of him and his gang.
They talked about one instance where they watched him
arrive in his vehicle with his gang and they described his getting
out of the vehicle and they said they arrested him, and when they
arrested him he was wearing a flak jacket. A flak jacket is a
bulletproof vest made into an entire coat, it is a coat of armor,
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and he was wearing this, such was the terror that he brought to
this community. They introduced the flak jacket into evidence.
They then asked the judge for permission to let the jurors pass
the flak jacket, so they could experience this thing. Of course I
objected, that was completely wrong, but they did that, and each
of these poor jurors hefted this fifty-pound armor-plated coat, as
they passed it from one to the other, and they got the point.
Next, they had another officer talk about how in addition to
the flak jacket he was also carrying with him a submachine gun,
which they introduced into evidence, and, same request, same
objection, this was ridiculously inflammatory, but the judge
permitted the jurors to take the machine gun, and pass it
amongst themselves, and you can’t imagine, it’s one thing to
imagine in your mind a gun like that, but until you hold this
awful weapon of death, and feel the weight and the heft of the
thing and know that it was designed to kill, and it has no other
purpose. Until you have handled that, you don’t really get it.
Well, those jurors got it. He was a machine of death, protected by
armor plates and armed with a machine gun, stalking through
the public housing communities, and they were introducing this
as relevant to whether he was a future danger.
Things looked bad. Things already looked bad. The entire
community knew that he was going to be sentenced to death and
believed that he deserved just that. It was a foregone conclusion.
We had little or nothing to offer. We put on those who knew him,
and they said he was, in their estimation, a good guy. My last
witness was, I put on his mother, and she did what mothers do.
But nothing was disturbing, nothing was affecting, the
atmosphere of death that hung in the courtroom. Nothing. It was
an awful place to be.
My last witness was the mother of his children. We took a
recess before she came in, so I went out and knelt down in front of
her and explained that she would be the next witness, and that I
would ask her about my client. As I was going through the
questions with her that I was going to ask, she was holding in her
arms their infant child and seated on her lap was their young
daughter, five years old. As I was talking to them, the little girl
began playing with my fingers, as children do. I thought of
something just then. I said to the mother, when you go in, if I ask
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you to do something, do it. Don’t hesitate, just do it, no matter
what.
We went in, and I brought her in, she introduced herself, said
who she was, I asked the judge for permission for her to go out
and get the children so the jury could meet the children. The
judge knew that a death sentence was going to result, better safe
than sorry, let the defense do whatever they want, if he thinks
bringing the kids in is going to help, then let him do it. So he
said, “Sure, go ahead.” So she brought in the children, and I said,
“Judge, may we approach the jury rail?” and he said, “Yes, you
may.” And, law students, let me tell you, this is proper courtroom
decorum. You must always ask for leave of court to approach the
jury, to bring in an exhibit, you must always do that, that is an
important function of the judiciary. But something had happened
there. We had quite properly now, we were standing right in front
of the jury—me, the mother of my client’s children, and his
children. Behind me was the prosecution, the team of
prosecutors, and over there was the judge. But the most
important thing was I was there with the jury.
So I looked at her and said, “Who is this in your arms?” and
she said, “This is Junior” and I said, having picked the only juror
who I thought would respond, “Please hand Junior to the juror.”
She reached out with the baby, and the juror just instinctively
reached out, and took my client’s baby into her arms. So I had a
juror rocking my client’s child. The prosecution awoke and they
objected. That’s understatement. There was a lot of yelling. The
judge was . . . pissed off. Don’t ever do that. What I did was
wrong, let there be no mistake about it, and I don’t seek to justify
it to you today. The judge demanded to know what I was doing,
and you know what I said, right? I said, “If they can hold a
machine gun, they can certainly hold a baby.” The judge let the
baby stay. I thought “What do I do now?” because things had
changed, everybody in the courtroom was now suddenly alert. So
I thought, “Well, let’s go one more step further.”
I took the little girl, and I lifted her up, and stood her on the
jury rail. She was precious. I said “How old are you?” “I’m five,”
as she waggles four chubby little fingers. I had just run out of
questions, because I don’t know what to ask children, so I said,
“Thank you” and I picked her up and set her down, and I said,
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“You may return the baby to the mother” and she did that, and I
said, “You may take the children out.”
Now, what I did, in retrospect, I think it’s hackneyed. When I
tell this story, I feel, what were you doing, what a cheap ploy,
could it possibly have had any effect? I’m a little embarrassed
about that, and what I did was certainly improper. But, you know
what, I felt at that moment as if I actually had done something. I
had made this instrument of death, my client, for one moment,
into someone who had actually done something good. He had
brought into life these two beautiful children. He wasn’t just a
monster. He was a person. A real person. So when we got to the
question of life or death, at the very least, everyone was going to
know it was a person that we were talking about.
I would like to think that what I did there made a difference,
but I am unconvinced. Because what happened next was that as
their mother was taking them out, the little girl, for the first
time, she spots her daddy out of the corner of her eye and she
spins, on her little patent leather Sunday best shoes, toward her
dad, and goes, “Daddy daddy daddy daddy,” just like that, and my
client looks up and he grins and just does a little finger wave
back at her. That moment was the life in the courtroom, a
courtroom that until that moment had been filled with nothing
but death, and the certainty of a death sentence.
The jury retired to deliberate. They had only one question:
death, or life without parole. They were out for many days. So
angry was the community that they were taking this long to
return a death sentence, that they tried very, very hard to find
me and where I lived to deliver in person the threats of death
that we were receiving at my office. There was someone else at
my house while I was in trial, when we were unable to reach her
we had to send the sheriff and many deputies, such was our
concern. That went well. The jury finally came back after several
days. They were hung, hopelessly hung, there was no chance of
resolution. Under Virginia law, that meant he received a sentence
of life. I had to leave town, this was right before Thanksgiving,
because the atmosphere was not good. But from that moment on I
knew that I had done something, as a human being, as a person,
and as a lawyer.
Now what you should know is that at the same time in my
career, I was also a court-appointed attorney. I mean, I was part
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of the indigent defense bar. I wasn’t a public defender, only half
of Virginia at that time, not even that, had public defender
offices, but I was one of those who routinely took court-appointed
cases. I did that for the first eighteen years of my [career], and
also took pro bono cases, and took, when I could get them, paying
cases. And to do that I was also a member of the indigent
community because I was flat broke. I mean, I was flat broke. In
order to practice on my own I sold everything I had, a little bit at
a time. Each winter, the question was, “Which utilities shall I
keep on this winter?” Generally I elected to keep electricity on,
but heat went first, the phone was routinely cut off because I
couldn’t pay my phone bills, my car died, I couldn’t replace parts
as they were broken, to the point of which, I had this old thing,
the starter quit, fortunately it was a standard transmission
vehicle, and some of you may know that, with those, if you put it
in gear and roll it down a hill, you can start the engine, and so
that’s how I got around. Which meant, of course, that every place
I went had to have sufficient incline that I could get it rolling, I
became very good at that.
And I loved it, you know that? I don’t want to go back there,
but I was a criminal defense lawyer and I was making a
difference. I was saving lives, I was preserving liberty, I was
protecting people, and I was also vindicating certain fundamental
freedoms because in the course of this work, and this is what I
miss the most, each and every day these court-appointed cases
would bring in these complex, potential constitutional issues,
issues that had never been identified or litigated before, that I
was able to take up, and I loved that about court-appointed work,
just the sheer volume.
As I did this work, I became better at it, but I also had a
sense of dissatisfaction because I was seeing the injustices that
some of our panelists have alluded to, occur day in and day out in
the courtroom. The lawyers being appointed, who everyone knew
were going to do nothing, absolutely nothing, for their client, and
yes, this offended me. Now in response to one of our panelists, no,
when you’re a lawyer in the audience, you don’t get up and
interrupt the proceedings to proclaim the unfairness, or you’ll be
arrested. But, see, our training, as lawyers, and the law license
that the state gives us, imposes on us, I believe this deeply, a
certain moral obligation to do what we can at any moment that
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the opportunity arises. Think of it this way: If you are standing
on a street corner and a puppy or a baby begins to wander into a
busy street, you have no legal duty to intervene, unless you’re the
parent, but you can stand there and watch the awful thing that
happens, and there’s no legal liability, but you certainly have a
moral obligation, don’t you? And I think that is what we have as
attorneys, and that’s why we have pro bono obligations.
Well, for the criminal defense lawyer, who is in the middle of
the system, we have that training to recognize fundamental
unfairness, constitutional issues, and we have that obligation to
object and to challenge. So, as I watched this, I realized, some
years ago, I needed to object.
I began in 1993, with a gentleman named Paul Husske. Now,
Mr. Husske had entered the criminal justice system on a
relatively minor misdemeanor. He had been accused, he had been
caught peeping in somebody’s window. So the court appointed a
lawyer, it was just a misdemeanor, and he agreed that he would
plead guilty, and get no time, all he had to do was go through sex
offender treatment, which was not much, but he had to do that.
During the course of that, they required that he meaningfully
participate, and that meant admitting to anything, any deviant
acts he had committed in the past. If he didn’t admit to his
wrongs in the past of a sexual nature, then he would not have
fulfilled the requirements of sex offender treatment, and he
would receive an active jail sentence that had otherwise been
suspended. So he did what he was required to do by the state, he
admitted to having committed rapes. The mental health worker
reported this fact, one thing led to another, and Mr. Husske was
arrested and charged with a series of rapes. I was appointed to
represent him.
I made the objections and litigated it all the way through the
Virginia Supreme Court, that this was a coerced statement,
confession, and was inadmissible, but I lost on that, and that
opinion is published, it’s called Husske v. Commonwealth.1 So we
went to trial. What I did, though, in the trial, turned out to be
important, not so much for Mr. Husske, but for the system of law
and all of us in general, because there was DNA in the case, in
addition to the confession, there was DNA. This was in 1993,
1.

Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
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these were the early days of DNA, and so my objection was that
we were not prepared to go to trial, and could not go to trial,
because the state was denying us a basic tool of an adequate
defense, and that was a DNA expert, we had to have that. We
litigated this pre-trial, we lost, but ultimately prevailed in the
Virginia Supreme Court, and the Virginia Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right to expert forensic assistance,
under certain conditions.2 I had achieved something. That was a
three-year battle, and that’s something I was able to do as a
court-appointed lawyer.
Fresh from that 1996 success in reforming the law, I turned
next to the biggest problem that I saw facing the indigent defense
community in Virginia, and that was mandatory fee caps. In
1997, when I was appointed to represent a man named
Salahundin Webb, charged with first-degree murder of a young
teenager, I accepted the appointment, it was going to be a
troublesome case. It was troublesome for a number of reasons,
one of them being that Mr. Webb was helplessly schizophrenic;
and he was incompetent. We had competency hearings, and
during the course of the psychiatric evaluation Mr. Webb
explained to the psychologist that he really didn’t trust what was
going on because although Mr. Benjamin was a very nice man,
Mr. Webb was aware of the severe limitations on compensation
for court-appointed attorneys, and there just wasn’t anything in it
for the attorney, and so he didn’t expect the attorney to do
anything, and so, no, he didn’t trust the system whatsoever.
I read that, and I thought, well, you know, he’s right. I knew
that I was going to work as hard as it would take to defend him,
but he didn’t know that, and I thought, you know, Gideon [v.
Wainwright]3 and the Sixth Amendment4 doesn’t require a
defendant to take that risk, and let me tell you what I mean by
2. See id. at 925 (“We are of opinion that Ake and Caldwell, when read
together, require that the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon request, provide
indigent defendants with ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense,’ and, that in
certain instances, these basic tools may include the appointment of nonpsychiatric experts.” (citation omitted)).
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding the Sixth
Amendment required the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal
defendants).
4. U.S. CONST., amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
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that. Back then, the way the indigent court-appointed
compensation system worked, is we were paid on an hourly basis,
$45 out-of-court, $65 in-court, not bad for court-appointed work,
for each hour that we worked. The problem was that for the most
serious of crimes, that is, crimes with a potential penalty greater
than twenty years, up to life imprisonment, well, let me back up.
There were caps on what you could be paid. You got paid by the
hour, up to a certain cap, a ceiling on the compensation you could
receive, and once you hit that cap, then you could not be paid
anything else. The judge had no power to waive the cap, that’s all
you could be paid for your representation. So in an offense like
first-degree murder that carried up to life imprisonment, no
matter how many hundreds of hours you might expend in pretrial litigation, no matter how many weeks you might be in trial,
no matter what, no matter how many hundreds of hours you
spent, the most that you could be paid for your representation of
an indigent accused of first-degree murder was $575.
This covered just a handful of hours. What this meant was
that after you had spent ten hours or so of representation, two
things: you weren’t getting paid any more, but in addition, you
see, you have to keep your office going, overhead. I moved to
dismiss the prosecution. I put on evidence of all these factors,
including evidence that it cost a frugal solo practitioner, if he
worked, took no vacation, if he worked forty hours a week, fiftytwo weeks a year, that it cost him $62 an hour just to keep his
office open, and that’s before he received any compensation. And
so what would happen is as soon as you hit that cap, not only
were you not receiving compensation, it was costing you, the
private attorney, the businessman, $62 an hour just to keep your
office going so you could provide free [representation]. In other
words, this presented a debilitating financial disincentive to
working anywhere beyond that handful of hours the state was
willing to pay for you, and this I identified as a conflict of
interest.
Now conflicts of interest, in the criminal justice system, we’re
familiar with that when, for example, you claim to represent codefendants, and the law recognizes that that is an unavoidable
conflict of interest, you can’t be the attorney for two people facing
the same charge because there will always be differences, some
situations will be mitigated, and so the law will not permit you to
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do that. If a judge, faced with this, fails to make an inquiry into
the fact of conflict, then the case is reversed, even if there is no
demonstration of prejudice, that’s the law of conflict of interest.
I further put on evidence that the practice in Virginia had
become one of a substandard practice, that as a result of these
caps indigent defense was substandard, that lawyers used and
employed a double standard of representation, one standard for
the paying client, second standard, out of necessity, out of
financial necessity, for the indigent. Having put all this on, then I
argued that under the law, under Gideon, and the subsequent
cases, that the Sixth Amendment right meant not only the right
to assistance of counsel but also the right, and this was the
holding of Wood v. Georgia,5 a later case, the right to conflict-free
counsel.6 Just as the state could not appoint an attorney to
represent co-defendants, the state could not create by statute an
unavoidable financial disincentive. That was a conflict of interest.
The judge heard all this, and he denied it, and that’s how the
law advances. The trial judge had denied my request, my
objection to the state’s failure to provide a forensic expert in
Husske, and so the law typically advances with preserving the
objection, making the record, and moving on to appeal, so the law
can adapt, and change, and progress as circumstances and society
changes. That’s what led to the recognition of the right to a
mental health expert in Ake v. [Oklahoma]7 in 1985, the role of
psychiatry and the role of mental health defenses in the criminal
justice system had evolved to the point that it was recognized as a
basic tool of an adequate defense8 and so this was the same thing
for our forensic expert. I intended to appeal.
But, the thing is, my objection had captured a great deal of
attention and there was a lot in the paper. So at the next criminal
docket call, another trial court judge made an announcement to
5. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
6. See id. at 271 (“Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth
Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is
free from conflicts of interest.”).
7. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
8. See id. at 78–83 (describing evolution of psychiatry in the criminal
justice system and holding that when a defendant can show his sanity will be at
issue in the trial, the state must provide a competent psychiatric expert to assist
in the defense).
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the criminal bar and said that he had read about this objection to
the court-appointed scheme in Virginia and that he was outraged
that an attorney would make such an objection, that henceforth
there would be no more such objections. That’s unconscionable.
That’s what we do: we object. That’s part of our fundamental
duties as defense lawyers, to challenge the process. Question the
proof, challenge the process. That is our fundamental, sworn legal
duty, and he was announcing: No more constitutional objections.
As each lawyer came up, he said, “I’m going to ask each of
you, as you come up, do you feel you have this conflict of interest
under Virginia law? Because if you do, the court will take you off
the list of attorneys permitted to accept court-appointed cases.”
And having been ambushed, in their defense, by this declaration,
and quite frankly, counting on court-appointed work as their
livelihood, lawyer after lawyer went up and they were questioned
by the judge, and they all said, “No, sir, I don’t understand that to
be a problem.” He said, “Fine, I’ll set your case for trial.” My turn
came, and, you know, there’s so much involved in being a good
lawyer, and one of those things is just being aware of everything
around you, and paying attention to detail, and one of the details
I noticed was that there was no court reporter there. He said,
“Mr. Benjamin, do you have a conflict?” and I said, “Judge, let me
suggest, and move, that we move this to a special day and time to
reconsider your question,” and he said, “Fine.”
That day came, and I had a court reporter there. He asked
me about my objection, and did I intend to raise this objection,
and I said, “I certainly do. Look, before I answer that question, I
want to tell you something. It has been my privilege to have
served on this list,” the court-appointed list, “and to have served
this court for a very long time. However, I am removing myself
from the list of attorneys eligible to accept court-appointed cases
in this county, and I am taking this action so that there will be no
question in the future whether my judgment on behalf of any
individual client is affected by fear of reprisal,” and I had
summarized the sanctions and the threats that he had made so
that was clear on the record and I said I was taking myself off the
list. And I said, “But I am not withdrawing from the
representation of this individual to whom I have been appointed
as his attorney.” The judge said, “What would you have me do? If
you’re not going to promise me you’re not going to make this
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objection, what am I supposed to do?” and I said, “You’re
supposed to,” I’m certain my words were much more succinct, but
what I said to him was, “I want you to be a judge and I want you
to rule on the objections that I, in my own discretion, choose to
make. So hear me now, if I decide to make a constitutional
objection, on any basis, including an unavoidable conflict of
interest within this system on behalf of this client, then I will
make that objection.” And he said, “Fine, you’re removed from
this case.” The next morning I had another case that came up, it
was a court-appointed case, and lo and behold, we’re in front of
the same judge. Same colloquy: “Do you intend . . .,” “Yes I do,”
“You’re removed.” The day after that, another court-appointed
case, incredibly, same judge, same colloquy, same result. I started
to sense a trend.
Meanwhile, things had become very, very ugly, there were
threats of disbarment, of disciplinary proceedings. I was never
sure what the ethical thing was I may have breached, and nobody
else was either, because that never materialized, but it was a
grave concern. Meanwhile I was calling NACDL9 and talking to
my mentors there for a little assurance that they had my back.
There’s tremendous value in NACDL, because in the courtroom
you’re all alone. Kind judges would take me into the back and ask
me, “What are you doing? You’re a good lawyer, everybody likes
you, but this is bad. Come on.” Everything was going down that
road, and this was during a two-week period.
Finally, one case, another murder case, had been set for trial
and that judge called us back in and said, “Mr. Benjamin, I just
can’t ignore this. Yes, you’ve raised the objection, and I denied it,”
this was another matter where I had preserved the objection,
that’s what we do. He said, “But I want to go back through this,”
because obviously he had gotten pressure from the other judges,
and so we went back through it, and I kept explaining the conflict
of interest, it’s unavoidable, remove me, appoint another lawyer,
whether he knows it or not, the same financial disincentive works
there, unless he’s able to do this first-degree murder defense in
like five hours or so, which he can’t, then each hour he works is
going to cost him out of his own pocket. He might not mind, but
the point is the client shouldn’t have to accept that risk. The
9.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
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Sixth Amendment and Gideon doesn’t require the assumption of
the risk that an attorney is going to discharge his ethical
obligations. That’s not Gideon. The judge said, “No, I’m going to
remove you.” At that point, he turned to my client and said
“You’re the victim here,” I loved that, a defendant in a firstdegree murder case being called a victim, “How do you feel?” My
client, bless his heart, said, “Please don’t remove Mr. Benjamin
from this case, he’s my lawyer, and I trust him, and you’ve got me
set for trial in just a couple days, don’t do this to me.” And the
judge said, “I’ll think about it over the weekend.”
On Monday he announced that he would leave me in, he did,
and we went to trial. Interesting story, my client had refused to
cooperate with my defense, and said, “Look, I’m innocent, just
prove me innocent,” and that was about it. Well, we had done a
tremendous amount of work, far beyond the caps. We had dug
into our pocket and hired a private investigator, and so we did
that. We did that. We proved he was innocent. During my crossexamination of his wife—see, he was accused of having killed his
mistress shortly after a dalliance in a local apartment, and when
they walked out, somebody, they say he did, killed her. His wife
testified and I cross-examined her and I did OK, and I think it
became clear who was really guilty. But then during the course of
this we were also able to bring in witnesses who testified to her
having admitted having done it, and many, many things came
into play, but the point is we demonstrated his innocence so well
they arrested her mid-trial. Obviously they had to do something
with his charges, dismiss them, and that turned out to be my last
court-appointed case.
But I wasn’t done. Of course not. What we did next, and we
did the appeal I had talked to you about, and that was
unsuccessful, the Virginia Supreme Court did not feel that they
could review this question for a variety of reasons. And that’s
when I did what we do as defense lawyers, I went then to
NACDL, and this is where the power of the organized bar comes
into play. I said, “We need your help in Virginia.” And they got it,
and they understood, because this is what the organized bar will
do. What happened is over the next eight years NACDL focused
its efforts and its resources and its funds on Virginia and we went
to work. We commissioned a study, you’ve got to have a study, we
did a study of the system there. We brought in Covington &
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Burling to do pro bono assistance, and they did a magnificent job,
dedicating years of attorney power to this. We did a broad, across
every front you’ve got to deal with, I had every editorial writer in
the state, and The Washington Post editorializing on injustice in
Virginia. I was talking indigent defense 24/7 on every possible
front. Every time someone was exonerated I was bringing it
forward, it was nothing but a seething morass of injustice and
inhumanity 24/7. Still, no movement on those damn caps.
Finally, Covington [said], “Hey, we’ve got to pull the trigger.”
We put together a class-action lawsuit. Once it’s filed, things
change dramatically, including, you could lose, for any number of
reasons, other than the merits. So we met the summer of 2006
with the attorney general, to show him the class action we were
prepared to file, and he said, “Look, I understand. But if you file
this I have to become adverse to you. I am your friend. Let me
work with you one more legislative session.” So we agreed, but
that was a very difficult decision to make.
That following session we worked with the state political
leadership, including some very law-and-order folks, who
understood, because we had educated them, we had educated
them through years of efforts and talks, and because of the
credibility of the folks that we brought into the process. At the
end of that legislative session, in 2007, almost ten years, well,
actually, ten years after I first raised, I first dared as an
individual defense lawyer in an individual, court-appointed case,
to raise an objection, to dare to question the adequacy of the state
compensation, ten years later the Virginia General Assembly
voted to, and did, abolish the caps on indigent defense
compensation.
We made a difference. I did, because I did what defense
lawyers do, I stood up to the tyranny of a judge who would not
permit an objection on constitutional grounds at threat of
sanction. I stood up to that. I put myself at risk, and I’d do it
again. I put at risk my young, at the time, associate, now brilliant
law partner, because she was dragged into this too because of
guilt by association. That’s what I did, that’s what we did with
NACDL. We did this together. That’s how any court-appointed
lawyer, any public defender, can make a fundamental difference
in the criminal justice system and in society.
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And it kept getting better. Virginia, when we began this, was
51st, counting D.C., in the nation in what we paid to courtappointed attorneys because of the draconian effect of that
mandatory cap, 51st, and not even close to number 50. Alabama
and Mississippi shone by example next to Virginia. I think we are
now in the tops, overall, in how we provide indigent defense. We
now have an indigent defense commission that regulates and
oversees public defenders and the private, court-appointed bar.
We have standards of practice that are brilliant. We have an
enforcement mechanism for the standards of practice. We even
have a complaint process so that individual defendants can
complain about their own attorney and a resolution process. We
have training that is untouchable: a boot camp for new public
defenders, weekly sessions, annual training, and, then finally, the
Supreme Court sponsors a free advanced indigent defense
seminar every year, we have 650 attorneys attending in one room
with two satellite locations, and we fly in the very best from
across the country to teach indigent defense. That is Virginia
now.
And so, today and yesterday as we talk about Gideon and the
promise of Gideon, as we have some very interesting and
stimulating discussions that dare to question the existence or the
expansion of Gideon and even raise the question of whether we
might, just out of practicality, consider turning some of the
attorney functions over to nonattorneys, I want to tell you, if I
haven’t conveyed this yet, what it is to be a criminal defense
lawyer, because it is a remarkable thing.
Gideon is a promise, right? Well, so is the Fourth
Amendment, and that hasn’t worked out so well. A right without
a remedy is a meaningless ideal, and that’s what Gideon, the
promise of Gideon, would be except for one thing, there’s one
reason why it works. It means that no prosecution can proceed
unless there is an attorney in that courtroom. And if there isn’t an
attorney there, and by that I don’t mean, just a warm body with a
law license. I mean somebody who’s had the experience, and the
training, the education to identify even in a trespassing case—I
took a trespassing case, I was in the United States Supreme
Court, I argued a misdemeanor trespassing case because it
presented fundamental due process and free speech issues, that I,
as an attorney, could recognize in the course of defending, pro
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bono, a trespassing case. The gift of Gideon is that they have to
have an attorney present.
Gideon still works no matter how poorly they pay us, no
matter how harsh their rulings, no matter how unfair the system.
It doesn’t matter. If you’re a court-appointed attorney, you
embrace the challenge because of your passion and your belief.
That’s what it is to be a court-appointed lawyer, and that is what
makes Gideon work. It’s because of who we are. I want you to
understand that we become lawyers not to lie down. We become
lawyers because we believe in freedom, we believe in the inherent
worth of the individual, and we believe in the fair and equal
protection of the law. These are our core beliefs. This is who we
are as people. And because we fear the unchecked power of
government, the power of government, always remember what
the stakes are, when you talk about can we take a lawyer out of
the equation. Remember, what we’re talking about is the
complete, raw power of the government against one individual,
and the question being can that government take his life, or his
liberty. And the only thing that checks that power is an attorney.
So when we talk about maybe decoupling the requirement of
a lawyer here and there, remember what we’re talking about;
that is, the unchecked power of government that we fear. We fear
it just as we fear the irrational hatred, the bloodlust of an angry
mob, and very often, too often, that is exactly what our
government appears to be, the lynch mob of old, and we are the
only thing standing between them and the accused. We became
lawyers because we are incapable, we are simply incapable, of
walking away from injustice. Because we believe, I think the best
state slogan there is in the entire country, “Thus Always to
Tyrants.”10 I love that. That’s how we see ourselves. That is how
we respond to tyranny. That’s why we became lawyers: to do
battle. To slay tyrants. To protect liberty. That is who we are, no
matter what.
And so the strength of Gideon is in what we do. We come
forward to confront injustice when no one else will. That’s who we
are as lawyers. We speak for those who have no voice, we sacrifice
10. The state motto of Virginia is “Sic Semper Tyrannis,” or “Thus Always
to Tyrants.” JANET V. KELLY, SEC’Y OF THE COMMONWEALTH, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 10 (2013), http://www.commonwealth.
virginia.gov/StateGovernment/BlueBook/2012-2013/Virginia%20Facts.pdf.
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for those who have no resources, and we defend with every ounce
of our being those who have no means to answer an accusation
that would otherwise take away their life or deprive them of their
freedom. We don’t do this for recognition. We certainly don’t do
this for reward. We do this because what unites us is an
understanding of a moral obligation to stand up so that tyranny
won’t prevail. It’s that simple. That’s what lawyers understand.
Now, there [are] hardships. It’s not easy, and I’ve tried to
illustrate that with what I’ve talked to you about. Those
hardships, it’s the anguish of responsibility for another person’s
life. Nights of—you think it’s bad the night before an exam?
Nights of fitful sleep and trial dreams, you know, the days of
eking out an existence on court-appointed pay, the threats and
the hatred to which we and our families are exposed. Anyone else
would quit. But the strength of Gideon is that criminal defense
lawyers will not. We call ourselves liberty’s last champion. To
give life to that, we do what we do, we return to those courts that
anyone else would abandon, and we fight another day, and
another day after that for our clients, for their rights, for the
freedoms of us all, and we do this until we can do it no more.
Until we’re depleted, our objections, our arguments, our pleas are
exhausted and we have quite simply nothing more to give.
That’s why we come together. I can’t overstate the power,
and the strength, and the need for the organized bar, and for the
criminal defense lawyers it’s the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers. Because when we come together from wherever
we practice, we draw strength from each other, much as I think
we are drawing strength today, from the shared experiences and
the losses and the victories that we sustain in a world that no one
else can possibly understand. That’s my request for all of us
today, as we consider the challenges, the failures of Gideon and
the solutions toward moving forward, that we also remember the
strength of having a criminal defense lawyer, a real lawyer,
involved in the situation. With that strength, with that
involvement, we can do unimaginable things, and we can make a
very real difference. Thank you for letting me speak to you today.

